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The Past as What Past Industrial
Prologue? Conflicts within the
GOP Tell about the
Future of the Bush
Administration
Thomas Ferguson
This article analyzes patterns ofGOP campaignfinance with an eye to the light they can
shed on thefuture ofthe Bush administration. Afterflashing back to 1980 and 1984, it
presents a detailed statistical breakdown ofwho contributed to whom in the 1988 GOP
primary, based on a large and carefully constructed sample oftop corporate executives
and investors. The Dole campaign emerges as especially importantfor the clues it pro-
vides about the opponents ofmajor changes in U. S. policy toward Eastern Europe and
the USSR.
In the fall of 1989, as the trees pass from green to gold and long columns of birds twist
southward in the ever paler sunlight, the George Bush administration still appears to be
enjoying an exquisite Indian summer. The president's Gallup polls are high — far higher
than Ronald Reagan's at this stage of his first term. The stock market has broken all rec-
ords. The press, especially the networks, has been kind, amiably losing interest in Iran-
contra, the slow pace of appointments, and the spring flap with the Europeans over weap-
ons modernization and arms control. And a thick black cloud of scandal continues to
engulf congressional Democrats, all but obscuring Republican transgressions at HUD
and elsewhere.
Beneath the calm, however, undercurrents of anxiety are everywhere detectable. The
possibility that even a mild recession could turn into the long dreaded "hard landing" of
the economy alarms many, regardless of their political persuasion or the value of the junk
bonds in their portfolios. Almost every informed observer believes that the eventual cost
of the savings and loan bailout will be far greater than the administration now admits,
while all scoff at the possibility that the budget targets mandated by Gramm-Rudman for
1990 and 1991 can be met.
There is more. As jails fill literally to overflowing, the administration's newly pro-
claimed war on drugs eerily recalls the early days of another war that the government tried
to win on the cheap by emphasizing force and neglecting controlling, but more elusive,
social factors. Conflict over defense spending is intensifying as Congress and the Defense
establishment try to pick and choose among weapons systems. And lost in the avalanche
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of publicity about Mikhail Gorbachev and Eastern Europe is the plain fact that support is
also ebbing in Japan, West Germany, and even in Great Britain for conservative regimes
long allied with the United States; that Latin America teeters on the edge of chaos; and
that a whole new "arc of crisis," which stretches from Pakistan through Burma and Korea
to the Philippines, is emerging — a circumstance that will not disappear even if the Cold
War does.
Not surprisingly, last year's Democratic campaign rhetoric, like the Daniel Quayle
jokes, no longer amuses. If not now, then sometime soon, many people around the globe
are likely to start wondering "Where's George?" and debating how best to read the mind
of the man who told everyone to read his lips.
Save for the fortunate few sufficiently affluent to afford to purchase the expensive serv-
ices of a Washington "insider," most will not find this problem easy to solve. The admin-
istration's exiguous track record thus far sheds comparatively little light on its likely
behavior in a crunch. Nor are the abundant press accounts of puppies, golf, the presi-
dent's relations with Kennebunkport lobstermen, or how he relates to the family we all
now recognize as "strong" likely to prove helpful.
How then can one forecast what the administration might do?
A perfectly sensible answer exists to this question, which this article proposes to ex-
plore. All through the 1980s, the Federal Election Commission has been piling up data
on campaign contributions to candidates of both major parties. This data is certainly in-
complete, but, in contrast to most speculations in the press and the social sciences, it
provides real information that is quite independent of anyone's particular political views
or theories.
Accordingly, relying on methods developed in earlier essays, this article attempts to
combine data on the campaign contributions of top investors — the heads of the largest
companies and principal Wall Street firms, the Forbes 400 richest Americans, and so
forth — with economic theory and what is known about the pattern of corporate support in
the 1980 and 1984 elections to produce a kind ofX ray of the new administration's princi-
pal corporate political constituencies. By attending carefully to what each believes to be
its interest and judging as best one can whether any is apt to get its way, one is likely to do
far better at forecasting the future of the Bush administration than, for example, by trying
to read the mind of an electorate that in off-year elections has now dwindled in many parts
of the United States to below the levels of 1798, when property suffrage restrictions were
commonly in force.
'
It is convenient to begin by casting a glance back to 1981 , the heady days communicants
now celebrate as the "Reagan Revolution's" heroic period, for the divisions that surfaced
within the business community during the 1988 election follow immediately from the
policy dilemmas created by the decisions taken then.
At that time, the height of what might be termed the laissez-faire revival, the incoming
Republican administration sought sweeping changes in both American society and the
world order. In the name of restoring domestic economic growth, it sought major cuts in
taxes on high incomes and corporations, rollbacks in environmental and safety regula-
tions promulgated in the 1970s, major reductions in federal ownership and spending, and
a broad deregulation of the economy, including major changes in the administration of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Its ambitions, however, did not stop at the water's edge. It planned not only to make
America, but the world, safe for free enterprise (which it identified with "economic
growth" tout court). To reverse what it claimed was a decline in American power around
the globe, the administration commenced the largest military buildup in history, with a
particular focus on the navy. It heated up the Cold War, pressuring Europe and Japan to
rearm and restrict exports to the Soviet bloc. It also sought to roll back the tide of state-
owned enterprise in the Third World and to pressure other countries to deregulate their
own markets, especially in finance. And it aggressively intervened in various Third World
trouble spots in favor of regimes it preferred. 2
The almost millenarian frenzy with which the administration approached these Sis-
yphean labors in its early days invited analysts, friends and critics alike, to view it as a
political formation sui generis. Critics, in particular, tended to treat Reaganism as the
political program of a newly unified business community.
For a few months of 1980-1981 this line of thought is not misleading. A global analysis
of Reaganism in these terms, however, invites serious misunderstanding. It makes it im-
possible to understand the dynamics of the two Reagan terms — with the abrupt switch
toward detente and interallied (G5 or G7, depending on the number of consulting coun-
tries) economic cooperation during the second term — or to analyze the forces now bear-
ing on the Bush administration.
The truth is that the Reagan coalition always had a huge seam running down its middle.
That seam, in the last analysis, the ineluctable consequence of living in the world econ-
omy that we do, divided the Reagan camp into two distinct blocs, each of which, in turn,
was crisscrossed by other seams too complicated to discuss now. The policies of the
Reagan administration served, or appeared to serve, the interests of major parts of both.
Each, however, had a somewhat different interpretation of what it thought was really
happening, and they basically disagreed about where the policies were supposed to lead.
In effect, the Reagan Revolution was a giant banner under which two columns marched in
different directions.
The first "bloc" (one almost hesitates to employ the expression, since this group, in
sharp contrast to the second, exists largely in a reactive mode, defined preeminently by
what it opposes, and since the 1930s, when it lost its dominant position in American soci-
ety, has never succeeded in articulating a well-developed alterative point of view) might be
referred to as the "protectionist" bloc.
As the label suggests, this bloc, centered in old industries long tied to the GOP, like
textiles or steel, saw the Reagan Revolution largely as political and economic Alka-Selt-
zer: relief— from imports, from labor, from hated government regulators, and, perhaps,
from endlessly menacing Communists — was only a jubilant swallow away.
In sharp contrast the second bloc, or more precisely, its leading spokespersons, who
set the tone for the rest, were thinking far more expansively (and they were indeed
thinking, in the sense that all through this period they were making major investments in
policy-oriented research published through a wide variety of think tanks and research
institutions).
To sum up the views of this second "multinational" bloc in a few pithy sentences inevi-
tably invites caricature and risks exaggerating the degree of centralization and consensus
within it. Nevertheless, with due allowance for these pitfalls, its thinking can be not inac-
curately analyzed as the polar opposite of the fashionable "imperial overextension" cri-
tique of Reaganism brought to public attention most forcibly by Yale historian Paul
Kennedy in his Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers. 3
It is not that the business leaders — organized in such groups as the Committee for the
Present Danger — who in 1980 were calling for a six-hundred-ship navy, worldwide "hori-
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zontal escalation" in the event of war with the Soviet Union, major new weapons modern-
ization programs, and an end to the "Vietnam syndrome" — necessarily shrank from
analogies with the Dutch, French, or British empires. It is that they saw — and, with some
qualifications, continue to see — the comparison differently.
In their view, the overriding issue in the world was whether the three great economic
areas — the Pacific Rim, the Americas, and Western Europe — were going to develop
"cooperatively" into one essentially "worldwide" multinational market, or whether these
areas would go their own way, probably under the influence of a regional hegemony. The
way this issue was resolved would shape development in the Third World and, in the long
run, perhaps even the Second.
From this standpoint the vast American expenditures on military force and foreign aid
that critics of imperial overextension fear will bankrupt the United States actually repre-
sented major investments — in free trade and an integrated world economy committed to a
dollar standard.
Not only would these investments help stabilize the Third World, and thus lower the
target rate of return a multinational required before deciding to invest, but the military
buildup, in addition, was a vital U.S. bargaining chip with the other major Allied govern-
ments. Only the United States could afford the fabulous costs of the guarantees, both
conventional and nuclear, that, in a deep sense, provided the social overhead capital for
the postwar recoveries of Japan and Western Europe. And only the United States could
project enough force into the Middle East to protect the oil supplies of the Allies.
As long as the United States maintained its military dominance, therefore, European
governments had little incentive to try to go their own way, and many reasons to cooper-
ate. So did the Japanese, a fact that by 1980 had become of towering significance to many
American businesses, which were increasingly convinced that exclusion from the Pacific
implied banishment from the next century's fastest-growing region.
In the late seventies, after the West German refusal to reflate in tandem with the United
States and Japan wrecked the Bonn summit, most members of the second bloc — which
included multinational manufacturers and financiers, but many exporters, high-tech
firms, oil companies, and weapons producers as well — became convinced that only
dramatic (albeit temporary, for the eventual policy aim remained cooperation) unilateral
action by the United States could break the economic deadlock that was developing in the
"Triad" (today's buzzword) or "Trilateral" (yesterday's) world and avert the drift toward
state-owned enterprises in the Third World. With increasing talk of repricing internation-
ally traded raw materials (read oil) in another currency as U.S. rates of inflation raced
ahead and the dollar depreciated, these businessmen — and increasingly -women — also
became convinced that only truly Draconian monetary policies could end inflation and
save the dollar.
The atmosphere of intensifying crisis enormously advantaged the only political party
for which massive social expenditure cuts were thinkable: the GOP Multinationals that
had been perfectly prepared to support Democrats during the New Deal era abruptly cut
off their support or intensified their commitments to Republicans. So, at the same time,
did the traditional protectionist bloc. Not surprisingly, the first result was confusion, as
all sorts of "new right," "old right," and "neoconservative" cultural and political entre-
preneurs competed to tap the rivers of cash that rapidly began flowing.
Under the inflexible pressure of political deadlines, however, a more or less articulate
compromise emerged within the Republican party. Candidate Reagan struck a formal
agreement with Senator Strom Thurmond on behalf of the textile industry and appears to
have made promises to several other industries, including steel, while publicly trumpeting
the merits of free trade. The prospective general revision of General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trades (GATT) ardently desired by the free traders was put off until after the
administration had had some time to force restructuring on the rest of the world, while
powerful industries were promised piecemeal protection in the meantime. 4
By temporarily removing the divisive trade issue from the agenda, this deal — which, it
should probably be noted, was struck by Ronald Reagan rather than George Bush, the
first choice of many multinationalists in the Eastern Establishment — opened the way for
the Golden Horde that financed the GOP's sweeping triumph in the fall of 1980. Once the
decision to raise interest rates was taken by Paul Volcker during the Carter administration,
for example, what multinational would object to domestic restructuring? And as they
contemplated the promised import relief, what protectionist would object to a new
Cold War?
From this vantage point it is easy to see the logic that drove the Reagan administration
first to forswear G5 cooperation and noisily to denounce the "evil empire," and then, in
early 1985, as James Baker took over at Treasury, dramatically to reverse both policies.
As it came to power the administration faced a set of decisions that could easily split its
coalition apart. Not surprisingly, it moved very cautiously. To the disgust of Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, it declined to make a major issue of Central America at that time.
To the dismay of social conservatives, it famously placed social issues on the back burner.
The Reagan administration concentrated instead on economic issues that sent broad
rivers of cash flowing to all its supporters in the business community: the military
buildup, deregulation, personnel changes at the NLRB, and the centerpiece of its eco-
nomic program, the famous tax cuts. After some fits and starts (the administration's
earliest economic projections rejected the advice that Herbert Stein, Walter Wriston, and
other analysts were giving it not to make the usual ritual promise to avoid fighting infla-
tion by means of unemployment, and envisioned only a short recession), the Reagan ad-
ministration fell in line with Volcker's high-interest-rate policies.
The result, from the administration's standpoint, was a series of striking successes.
Along with its new labor policies and deregulation, the high interest rates triggered a
sweeping reorganization of the work force. Unions lost ground and wage growth slowed
as many firms took advantage of the huge rise in unemployment to make major cuts in
staffing and changes in work rules. As other central banks transmitted the interest rate
rises to their countries — and, pushed by the Reagan administration, promoted deregula-
tion of their own economies — a worldwide movement toward laissez faire gained steam.
The growing climate of austerity, in turn, encouraged further cuts in social spending and
taxes everywhere, while the rise in the dollar reestablished its position as the world's
currency and started an export boom in Europe and Japan that helped undo the damage
caused by the evil-empire rhetoric.
The policies, however, could not be sustained forever. The price of the interest-rate rise
was the deepest recession of the postwar era. In the Third World growth ceased abso-
lutely, while in the United States imports flooded in and business bankruptcies mounted,
bringing friction with Japan and calls for import relief. Although they went along with the
intermediate nuclear forces (INF) deployment, Europeans resented the administration's
efforts to discourage business with the Soviets. And, as it seems clearly to have foreseen,
the administration failed to get enough spending cuts to offset the tax reductions, leading
to an enormous rise in the budget deficit.
Political opposition emerged on both the left and the right. On the "left" (the term is
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highly relative: the reference is to the differences within the business community), the
Democrats revived. A breakdown of 1984 Democratic campaign financing, done along
lines of that presented for 1988 below, shows clearly how real estate interests in (primar-
ily) the Northeast and Midwest moved to defend federal grants for urban infrastructure
and mass transit from the burgeoning claims of the defense budget. (Statistical tests
showed the real estate bloc, but not the other industries that also featured high levels of
Democratic contributions, supported only liberals, precisely what one would expect if
competing claims on the budget were the issue.) 5 As the deficit mounted, many invest-
ment bankers — and some insurance industry figures — joined them. 6
On the right Jack Kemp emerged as a champion of a "supply side" economics that was
essentially Reaganomics with low interest rates. For business its key claim was that if
interest rates were pushed low enough, the United States could grow its way out of the
deficits without any new taxes.
How the administration rode out this heavy weather bears close analysis for the light it
can shed on what a Bush administration might do. To defuse protectionist sentiments it
deployed a three-pronged strategy: to the biggest and most powerful industries, notably
steel and automobiles, it afforded continued piecemeal protection. To agriculture and
some exporters it offered limited export subsidies, either in the form of direct loans or, in
the case of some high-tech industries, funds for basic research. Finally, it pressed other
countries, particularly in East Asia, to open their markets to American products.
Faced with the need to hold together two blocs pulling in different directions, the ad-
ministration also made a set of fundamental choices on the deficit. Because the tax cuts
were so attractive to both blocs, but particularly to the protectionists, who were, after all,
fated to be submerged in the long run, they provided the perfect issue over which to make
a stand. Still hoping that ballooning deficits would eventually force spending cuts, the
administration proceeded, loudly and publicly, to draw a line in the sand.
To finance the deficits in the meantime, the administration devised a two-track strategy.
First it accepted "revenue enhancements" that did not threaten the sacrosanct position of
the top brackets, including a steep rise in highly regressive Social Security taxes, which
over time would close most of the deficit. Then, in a truly momentous decision, it elected
to let foreign capital finance the deficit.
From the standpoint of the multinational bloc as a whole, this move had a compelling
logic. By worldwide standards, direct investment in the American economy was quite low.
Direct investment, in sharp contrast to portfolio investment, is reasonably stable. Here,
accordingly, was a chance to square the circle. Provided no one moved to prohibit foreign
takeovers, capital could flow into the United States for years. As it did, it would support
the dollar while helping mightily to finance both the trade and the government deficits. At
the same time it would create a more powerful lobby in the United States in favor of free
trade and an integrated world economy, while also giving major foreign interests compel-
ling reasons to let U.S. multinationals continue operating in their home territory.
As interest rates fell in the wake of the Mexican debt rescue and defense spending began
to pull the economy out of its slump in classic Keynesian fashion, the administration had
the satisfaction of watching its new policies pay off. The economic revival and foreign
buying led to a tremendous boom in the stock market. The new wave of mergers and take-
overs, in turn, further restructured industry while creating a substantial number of new
fortunes in finance and commodities markets with a stake in Reaganomics.
The boom — an ingredient of the largest political business cycle since the Great Depres-
sion — carried the administration safely through the 1984 elections. The continued
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strength of the dollar, however, fueled protectionist sentiment, further inflaming relations
with Japan and the Asian newly industrialized countries. By early 1985 it was obvious
that something had to be done or the whole postwar structure of multinational trade might
unravel as the U.S. Congress moved to retaliate.
The administration moved on several fronts at once. First it added wrinkles to the strat-
egy it had employed for defusing relations with Japan in 1983-1984. It pressed the Japa-
nese to open markets for a handful of the most impatient sectors, whose support it was
counting on to head off a protectionist upsurge, including telecommunications, electron-
ics, forest products, medical instruments, and pharmaceuticals.
Next, as an alternative to "industrial policy," the administration joined many Republi-
can big-business leaders in talking up "competitiveness," that is, the notion that improved
macropolicy and some broad structural changes (such as improvements in education) that
involved little direct market intervention might alleviate the overseas challenge.
Then, largely through the Pentagon (but mostly outside "Star Wars"), where by a mira-
cle of nomenclature "defense"-related production direction is not reckoned as a violation
of the principles of free enterprise, it announced a spectacular program of subsidies, again
mostly to "swing" industries dominated by multinationals in, or potentially in, the coali-
tion. Among these projects, which continued to be announced as Bush geared up to run
for the presidency, were a $4 billion supercollider project, a five-year, $1.7 billion pro-
gram in computing, a dramatic new "superconductor" initiative, contracts for a fabu-
lously expensive space station (the announcement called attention to the benefits the
project would produce for the pharmaceutical and electronic industries), "Sematech," a
joint venture between the government and high-tech companies, as well as other initiatives
in robotics, computer-aided manufacturing, and materials science.
While the administration was taking these little-publicized moves that might in time
transform the Pentagon into an American Ministry of International Trade and Industry, it
moved at last to bring the dollar down.
With Baker at the Treasury, a new and more delicate phase of relations with the Allies,
which leads directly to the policy dilemmas George Bush faces, began. In effect the ad-
ministration was seeking what might be termed a "gentler, kinder" dollar decline. For
this to happen, the cooperation of the Allies, particularly Japan and West Germany, was
essential. Specifically, if the dollar were to decline, thus reducing the imbalance in the
U.S. current account, the Japanese and Germans would not only have to agree to let their
export surpluses shrink, they would also have to expand their domestic economies to avoid
a decline in total world demand. They would, in addition, have to cooperate in guarding
the relative exchange rates of the major currencies, or there would be massive flight from
the dollar.
Neither country was eager to do any of this. Both had grown rich in the postwar period
by pursuing strategies of export-led growth, and both feared that an expansion of internal
demand might well disequilibrate carefully struck balances of power between labor and
management.
Baker, however, had several strong incentives of his own. First, in the background there
remained always the United States' trump card, its overwhelming comparative advantage
in defense. By pushing the Allies to do more — or sometimes by upping the ante of what
"security" required— the United States could exercise real leverage by threatening to
raise costs on them.
Second, there was Baker's well-advertised policy of negotiating bilateral trade treaties
with particular countries, the most significant of these being the recent agreement with
11
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Canada. By suggesting that the United States might go it alone with a handful of carefully
selected partners, these deals acted as a check on Allied intransigence.
In the end, however, Baker's most potent threat proved to be the simplest: the United
States could just threaten to let the exchange rate drop unilaterally if the Allies would not
agree to an orderly decline. Though in October 1987 this strategy of brinkmanship took
the world to the edge of the abyss, when Baker and other Treasury officials publicly ad-
monished the Germans for provoking an upcoming fall in the dollar and crash in the mar-
ket, in the end it worked. After bitter internal debates, Japan expanded internal demand
substantially and dismantled a few trade barriers. Germany also made rather feebler ef-
forts to expand. The dollar continued coming down until the summer of 1988, as foreign
central banks built up massive dollar reserves, in effect subsidizing (as several acute
critics noted) a vigorous political business cycle for Bush to run on. 7
Animated not only by its growing concern for Allied harmony, but also by the unyield-
ing pressures of the budget deficit and plain fact that if the United States would not sell to
the USSR, the West Germans would, the administration abandoned its strident anti-Soviet
posture. Led by new Commerce Secretary William Verity, food companies, capital goods
exporters, and several business organizations, the administration began to explore ave-
nues for increasing trade. It also, of course, negotiated the INF accord and a Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan.
In electoral terms there can scarcely be any question that the policy package Bush and
Baker were gradually fashioning for the vice president to run on — peace and prosper-
ity — was highly plausible, particularly if one refrained from asking awkward questions
about the long run. As an early Fortune poll of top executives indicated, and the astonish-
ingly high level of contributions revealed in my statistical study confirms, their agenda
commanded the loyalty of most main-line multinationals. 8
But multinationals — and Allied financiers — are far from the only business groups
active in the GOP. Moreover, major veins of dissatisfaction existed within the multina-
tional bloc itself, particularly in regard to detente.
As the 1988 campaign approached, ominous signs of dissatisfaction began to appear on
the right of the GOP. Congressman Jack Kemp, who during most of President Reagan's
tenure in office had usually been counted Bush's strongest prospective opponent for the
nomination, stridently denounced the INF treaty and began running furiously against
detente and the "sellout" of freedom fighters around the globe.
Donald Rumsfeld, once Gerald Ford's hawkish secretary of Defense and then CEO of
G.D Searle, a large pharmaceutical concern, began scouting a run, also looking right-
ward. So did another card-carrying multinational Cold Warrior, Alexander Haig.
Pierre du Pont, a onetime moderate Republican governor of Delaware, announced on a
platform that would have warmed the heart of the elder Pierre du Pont, who as head of the
family's chemical company during the New Deal was one of FDR's sharpest critics. Tel-
evangelist Pat Robertson also declared on a platform that on defense and many other top-
ics was well to the right of Attila the Hun. And to the surprise of practically everyone who
does not closely follow the political economy of the GOP, Senator Robert Dole finally
came down well to the Bush campaign's right.
Not all these candidates were equally formidable. Kemp, for example, was strongly
identified as the partisan of supply-side economics. In years past he had also drawn im-
portant supporters from aerospace and defense — enterprises for which the deficit func-
tions first of all as an entry in the profits column and which would certainly not be put off
by Kemp's insistence that detente was a dangerous illusion. But as earlier observed, the
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practical meaning of supply-side doctrines for the average business was lower interest
rates. By early 1988, however, Baker had been bringing the dollar down for almost three
years. With exports booming and the economy beginning to bump up against what most
business economists reckoned was full capacity (whatever the numbers of discouraged
workers who no longer figured in the unemployment statistics), what was the point of a
new monetary experiment? And despite the intraparty row over detente, the vice president
was obviously a plausible standard-bearer for defense in the fall campaign against the
Democrats.
Not surprisingly, few of the Republican business leaders who had in years past been
attracted to Kemp's "exciting new ideas" were still excited by them. When Kemp un-
furled the banner of aggressive free enterprise, only a comparative handful of deregula-
tion enthusiasts, such as Dow Chemical's Paul Oreffice, along with a fair number of
political action committees or executives from savings banks, utilities, and transportation
(Table 1), a few defense contractors (such as Martin Marietta's Thomas Pownall) faithful
to the end, and anointed keepers of the supply-side flame (including, for example, Lewis
Lehrman and a tiny knot of developers probably attracted by the future Housing and Ur-
ban Development secretary's emphasis on "enterprise zones") saluted. The rest, some-
times after pausing respectfully, moved on. 9
Table 1
Industries in Which Particular Republicans Did Well
(The universe of comparison is all Republican contributors.)
Bush (N = 436; 69%)
Oil (0.11)
Computers (0.06)*
Investment banking (0.13)
Utilities (0.13)*
Dupont(N = 112; 18%)
Chemicals (0.01)
Commercial banking (0.01)
Investment banking (0.01)
Haig(N = 13; 2%)
Aircraft (0.01)*
MNCO-MIC (0.07)*
Real estate (0.15)*
Dole (N = 324; 51 %)
Services (0.10)
Real estate (0.06)
Insurance (0.01)
Investment banking (0.02)
Autos (0.15)
MNCO-MIC (0.01)
Private hospitals (0.15)
Kemp(N = 60; 10%
Utilities (0.16)*
Savings banks (0.16)*
Transportation (0.12)*
Beverages (0.01)*
Real estate (0.05)*
Numbers in parentheses are significance levels, not strength; they indicate only positive differences
from each candidate's average industry appeal.
^Expected value in cell of chi-square less than 5; warns that power of test is low.
Source: Based on FEC data; see text.
Du Pont, in all probability, really had his eye on either the vice presidency or on 1992 or
1996. Save for the press, which kept hailing his iconoclasm and "courage" in tackling the
sacred cows of farm subsidies and Social Security, the family circle, which includes a
dazzling number of the Forbes 400 wealthiest Americans who, because they are concen-
trated in one industry, skew Table 1 's portrait of the chemical industry, and a surprising
number of top financiers and bank executives who, as the people most concerned with the
future of the dollar in the 1990s, were perhaps making small votive offerings in honor of
the "courage," he failed to attract much support from business, or anyone else.
13
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Neither did Haig, whose appeal as a right-wing internationalist overlapped that of the
later Dole or du Pont, but who also had to live down a reputation as an unguided missile.
(Perhaps appropriately, the aircraft industry and a specially defined bloc of superhawks
discussed below in reference to the Dole campaign backed him compared to other Repub-
licans at a statistically significant level.) 10 Rumsfeld, after contemplating what it costs to
run for president, thriftily called off his effort, as did Nevada Senator Paul Laxalt.
And Pat Robertson's campaign, for which the media and many scholars had been pre-
dicting a heavenly future, staggered under two deadly blows. First came the collapse of oil
prices, which badly hurt some of his major financial backers, like Nelson Bunker Hunt,
in the sector that had over the years probably invested more in fundamentalist politics than
any other. The coup de grace to it as a serious national threat, as distinct from annoying
party presence, came with the disastrous news, retailed for days with ill-concealed glee by
three big multinationals called ABC, NBC, and CBS, of apparent devilish doings in
Charlotte, North Carolina, by Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker, and an unorthodox form of
witness practiced in Louisiana motels by the Reverend Jimmy Swaggert.
That left Dole as the person with the best chance of stopping Bush. As all the world
knows, he came within a hair of doing precisely that. Because of the light it sheds on the
potential opposition the Bush presidency now faces, it is exceedingly instructive to see
how he did it.
It is possible that a few people who eventually hopped on the bandwagon did so simply
because they believed that Dole might run a stronger race than Bush, who was then
viewed by many in his party the way many Democrats now regard Michael Dukakis. Such
cases, however, should be scattered randomly, not concentrated in particular sectors —
and certainly not in sectors in which prominent industrialists are openly campaigning for
one or another particular issue. Though my data is not perfectly adapted for this task, it is
easy to show statistically that while Dole and Bush did have partially overlapping appeals,
Dole very clearly succeeded in tapping sectors (and parts of sectors) with a plausible
grievance against Bush."
Dole's initial campaign impressions, for example, derived mostly from the record he
had compiled as Senate Republican leader. In that role he had pressed hard on the deficit,
much harder than Bush. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, among Republican contributors Dole's
appeal to investment bankers and insurance executives — sellers and buyers, respectively,
of long-term bonds, as Democratic candidates know so well — stands out compared with
Bush's. (For both candidates, statistical tests of significance suggest each had above-
average support from investment bankers, but the results for Dole are impressive, while
the results for Bush are borderline.)
As he kicked off his campaign, he was also known as a friend of Israel, whereas Bush's
credentials on that score, while scarcely negligible, were suspect in some quarters. His
campaign contribution list also suggests a certain closeness with the commodities markets
(though here Bush and Baker were not idle: it is surely no accident that Treasury Secre-
tary Nicholas Brady has yet to move on his own report on the Crash, which recommended
reining in Chicago) and Dole was in any event a hero to large export-oriented farmers.
The veteran member of the Senate Finance Committee also seems to have attracted sup-
port from some private hospital chains and parts of the service industry.
All this, however, provided a rather narrow base. Dole tried developing the deficit issue
into a call for "burden sharing" by the European Allies (by which he appears to have
envisioned fewer cuts in U.S. defense expenditures rather than a more rapid European rise
in the future). This would have freed up resources for some domestic spending, which
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Dole several times pointedly observed had been neglected under Reagan, and Table 1
suggests that some real estate magnates either got (or more likely, sent) the message. But
the rest of the business community hung back. For all the talk about how the compassion-
ate, yet fiscally responsible Dole would make a stronger candidate against the Democrats,
the plain fact was that Bush's campaign was rolling ahead.
After hesitating almost interminably, Dole made a fateful choice. In a complex maneu-
ver, in which he came out for the INF treaty but positioned himself as a stern critic of the
other treaties the administration was talking up, he joined with the right and center-right
opponents of detente. He also spoke out strongly on the importance of the American posi-
tion in the Persian Gulf.
The result was a political coalition that leaves little trace in my regular industry analy-
sis, but which shows up spectacularly when one defines a very special universe of com-
parison: the largest (all those among the top 20 industrials on the 1987 Fortune list)
multinational oil companies except Occidental and Chevron (which both have major deals
in progress with the USSR) plus the subset of firms in the aircraft industry whose princi-
pal business is producing major warplanes and missiles. This "industry" (or better, world
historical force), shown in the table as the MNCO-MIC — Multinational Oil-Military -
Industrial Complex — bloc, swung massively for Dole. 12
As Dole rushed in on Bush, top executives or political action committees of companies
such as Lockheed, General Dynamics, Northrup, and Rockwell all contributed. Henry
Kissinger, the living incarnation of prudent multinational skepticism about detente, began
to confer with him. 13 A remarkable number of executives from big multinational oil con-
cerns also began donating. It is doubtful that oil-policy differences between the candi-
dates accounted for this. Bush and Dole did not differ greatly in regard to that policy,
though as the race heated up Dole made some halfhearted and not particularly convincing
noises about an oil tariff, which many independents, but not most majors, supported.
Along with gold, however, oil and natural gas are the principal balancing items in East-
West trade. Many Europeans, indeed, take it for granted that the primary limit on how
much they can sell the Soviets in the short run is how much gas Moscow can sell back to
them. With oil prices already down, it is unlikely that most major oil companies not in-
volved in deals with the Soviets relish the prospect of large-scale sales into the West any
more than they did in the 1920s or 1950s, when this issue spurred major agitation in
the industry.
Preston Tisch, the brother and close business associate of Lawrence Tisch, who had
recently acquired CBS, resigned as postmaster general, returned to CBS, and declared for
Dole. 14 Then, as the center-right criticism of Bush reached a crescendo just ahead of the
Iowa primary, Dan Rather, who had previously created a stir by briefly slipping into Af-
ghanistan, conducted a highly publicized interview with George Bush about his role in the
Iran-contra affair.
Though analysts debated who won that exchange, no one disputed that Dole defeated
Bush in Iowa, or, as Haig, Rumsfeld, and other multinational Cold Warriors came out for
him, that he seemed on the verge of knocking the vice president out of the race. In New
Hampshire, however, the Bush forces were led by Governor John Sununu who, like Bush
himself, was an ardent proponent of nuclear power (witness Table 1 's suggestion about the
utilities) 15 and the licensing of the controversial Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear plant.
Sununu, whose political rise began with the encouragement of a lobbyist for Westing-
house, 16 had taken great care to organize the state. Aided by enormous infusions of cash,
Bush's campaign eked out victory there.
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As the campaign headed south, Dole tried a classic maneuver. At least three times in the
past twenty years, a right-wing candidate confronting a strong free trader has cemented
the alliance of the center with the right by explicit commitments to textiles and other pro-
tectionist industrial sectors. Dole came out in public for protection. As top executives
from Bethlehem and USX, the automobile industry, some figures from the electronics
industry almost certainly worried about the Japanese, and prominent textile leaders, in-
cluding Roger Milliken (a prominent advocate of "buy American" policies) contributed
to his campaign, Dole struck a formal arrangement — like Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan before him— with South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, a longtime cham-
pion of the textile industry. 17
Now, however, the devastating long-term effects of the high dollar (and the benefits to
the free traders of the administration's decision to postpone major legislation at the time
Reagan's coalition came together) showed. After seven years of imports, and gradual
transformation of the southern industrial structure from a heavy reliance on textiles to
finance, services, and electronics, along with a few examples of successful textile restruc-
turing, the old southern protectionist industrial base was hollowed out. This time Thur-
mond couldn't deliver. The Bush machine's multinational juggernaut rolled over Dole,
effectively destroying his candidacy. It also flattened Pat Robertson, who, too, had made a
strong protectionist appeal and whose candidacy had been badly, perhaps fatally, hurt by
the oil price collapse, which had greatly limited efforts on his behalf by Bunker Hunt and
other southwestern supporters.
Being Right and President
An analysis of the sort presented here is a less than perfect substitute for a reliable crystal
ball and cannot hope to answer every possible query about the new administration's likely
course. Whether Vice President Daniel Quayle will be allowed out trick-or-treating on
Halloween, for example, is simply imponderable. We will just have to wait and see.
But it does allow one to see right through some of the most common postelection specu-
lations. In the first days of the new administration, for example, the press ran riot with
speculation about a major collision between the United States and Japan over decisions to
build the FSX, to designate Japan as an "unfair" competitor under the "super 301 " provi-
sions of the new trade bill, and other issues. The decision by the European Economic
Community to (attempt to) unify its domestic market by 1992 is also being built up as
an almost cliff-hanging drama involving confrontations with both the United States
and Japan.
The analysis here strongly indicates that these fears are vastly overdrawn. Strong con-
flicts of interest certainly exist between the United States, Japan, and Europe, and they
will put their stamp on the politics of all three in the years to come. It is also possible that
if world income fell sharply (the scenario that currently alarms most policymakers begins
with a sudden collapse of the Tokyo stock exchange), a major breach might open within
what used to be called the Western alliance. But considering the clearly transnational
objectives of the political coalition that elected George Bush, for example, his administra-
tion is about as likely to abandon G7 cooperation, the long-run goal of dollar stability (at,
to be sure, a somewhat lower rate in the long run than today's), or global free trade as it is
to usher in an American version of Solidarity. Global economic integration is what the
bloc that brought him to power is all about.
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At the same time the West Germans in particular are likely to reflate less than the ad-
ministration desires, so that if Martin Feldstein, with his constant talk of exchange rate
unilateralism, did not exist, the administration would have to invent him — as, very likely,
it has. On the other hand, the administration and the Fed are clearly worried that a rise in
the inflation rate would undermine dollar stability. They are also convinced that the U.S.
economy, while showing clear signs of a slowdown, is still operating near capacity. In
these circumstances, the last thing they think they need now is many more exports. Thus
they have no incentive to push the dollar far down in the near future, as some critics have
advocated.
In regard to the right wing of the GOP, the situation is very complex. After his sweep of
the southern primaries, Bush owes nothing to most protectionists (an exception is the steel
industry, to which he had to make a public commitment during the general election, and
probably automobiles), so that many older industries particularly are apt to find a Bush
administration harder to deal with than Reagan's. Also, so many American industries are
under pressure from Japan, there is no chance that the Bush administration can simply
stand on the principle of free trade. One suspects that with the newer industries, which
even many multinationalists believe have to be preserved in some form, the Bush adminis-
tration will go as far down the subsidy road that the Reagan administration took in its
second term as the budget deficit will allow.
In regard to that deficit, it is fairly easy to predict what the administration will do,
though it flies in the face of many conventional expectations. While far-right business
groups are less important to the Bush coalition than they were to Reagan's, the adminis-
tration has little to gain by allowing its broad GOP coalition to break up. Bush has every
reason, therefore, to continue dramatizing his credentials as a true Reaganite. The easiest
and most convincing way by far for him to do this is to hold fast to the tried-and-true
Reagan formula that was used in previous years to solve essentially the same problem: no
new taxes. For this to stick given the budget pressures, however, the administration will
have to turn a deaf ear to protests about the growing role of foreign capital in the economy
and guarantee a steady inflow of capital through G7 cooperation (particularly with Japan)
and no restrictions on foreign takeovers. It may also have to accept further "revenue en-
hancements" that do not encumber the top brackets, and it must succeed in its high-wire
act of lowering the economy's rate of growth while avoiding a recession.
My analysis of the Dole challenge, however, points to a final aspect of the Bush admin-
istration's policy that is as momentous as it is unheralded. On one hand, the flap over John
Tower's appointment as secretary of Defense and recurrent procurement controversies
indicate that the administration is prepared to nod to reality and rein in the rate of growth
of defense spending. Bush and Baker from time to time have also made friendly noises
toward Gorbachev, as if backhandedly to acknowledge that the present Soviet leadership is
truly distinctive and really striving to implement policy changes that are very much in the
interests of the United States and, indeed, the entire world.
This part of the administration's line resembles Bush's retorts to Dole and other Repub-
lican critics during the primaries. The meliorist perspective, however, ill comports with
the steady stream of "Cold War is not yet over" talk from Defense Secretary Richard
Cheney and many other commentators within and around the administration. More omi-
nously, however, it has not appeared to inspire the administration's concrete foreign pol-
icy actions.
That was most obvious in the late spring fiasco with the West Germans over the mod-
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ernization of NATO's short-range missiles. But the administration has also taken its time
preparing its negotiating posture in regard to talks on both strategic weapons and Euro-
pean conventional disarmament. Earlier allusions to rapid repeal of Jackson-Vanik re-
strictions on U.S. -Soviet trade have mysteriously faded, while predictions of major
Western loans to the Eastern bloc, including the USSR (which will almost certainly re-
quire financing to cover imports of consumer goods if perestroika is to have running
room) have yet to come true. 18 The Bush administration is also clearly walking away from
Poland, and perhaps from other Eastern European countries, and it is divided over
whether to support Soviet and Chinese admission to GATT.
A good-willed observer might attribute this pattern of inaction to confusion or bureau-
cratic delays. Alas, my statistical evidence about Dole's support in the primaries indicates
otherwise. The plain fact is that despite detente 's ionospheric ratings in the Gallup poll,
leading parts of American multinational business and the military are strongly opposed.
Once the Bush campaign decided to reach out to Dole's supporters — symbolized before
the election by Bush's postconvention rhetoric, when he sounded like Dole, and more
important, by the award after the election of the number two position in the State Depart-
ment to Lawrence Eagleberger, a literal representative of Kissinger Associates — it virtu-
ally guaranteed the paralysis that first showed during the highly touted spring policy
review of East-West issues, which persists.
Because the pressures of the budget deficit, other American multinationals and capital
goods exporters, and many Europeans, especially the Germans (who have by far the most
to lose) will be insistent, the administration may finally bend. But it would be rash to
underestimate the pressures to stand aside and watch Gorbachev go down (an eventuality
that could perhaps be hastened by public predictions ofjust such an occurrence by leading
administration spokespersons) — Dole, after all, almost defeated an incumbent vice presi-
dent. So while the Bush administration may finally embark on a "speak loudly and carry
a small stick" policy designed to mask the departures from the early years of the Reagan
era, the current situation, I fear, contains the seeds of a policy failure of historic propor-
tions.^
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crats and the Future ofAmerican Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986). The statistical tech-
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January-February 1989, 68-75. Save for points that might require special comment, it makes
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7. See David Hale, "Accounting for the Dollar Glut," Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1988.
8. These are overwhelmingly represented in the data discussed in the tables. American textile firms
fell so far that they are no longer well represented in this data, and their political behavior has to
be separately analyzed. For the Fortune poll, see the issue of February 1 5, 1 988.
9. The table also registers disproportionate support from beverages. One might well ask why. Scru-
tinizing the sample suggests a fairly obvious answer: for Kemp, the "cola wars" combine with
support from some well-known right-wing beer barons to drive the numbers up. It may also be
worth emphasizing how exiguous Kemp's real estate support really was. Bear in mind that the
table is limited to the universe of other Republican contributors, so that only Dole, whose support
from this sector was considerably larger, registers well by comparison with other Republicans.
When the comparison is extended to include all contributors to whatever presidential candidate
(in 1988), real estate, along with investment banking and parts of the computer industry, shows
up as one of the few industries that contributed disproportionately to the Democrats.
10. So did real estate, as the table shows. I report the result because I am not in the habit of editing
the numbers. But there is really nothing here: it rests on two contributions, which become (very
weakly) significant, because Haig usually attracted no contributions at all.
11. All the chi-square tests reported in this article depend on exclusive partitioning of the data; pro-
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13. See, e.g., the New York Times, January 20, 1988. The Boston Globe ran somewhat fuller notices
around the same time.
14. New York Times, January 11, 1988. Preston Tisch at the time indicated that he was normally a
Democrat.
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1 5. The other industries in the table for Bush might merit a word. Recall the previous discussion on
government support for the computer industry in negotiations with Japan. Oil needs no com-
ment, in general; nor do the (multinational free-trading) investment bankers, who barely make the
grade anyway. I strongly suspect interindustry differences play a role here, for in the Bush camp
are representatives of several firms that have prominently championed financial deregulation and
are actively lobbying to expand into the role of nonbank banks. Many other investment bankers
have strongly opposed this, and this industry was one of those most likely to back Democrats in
the 1988 election. See Ferguson, "Parties by Invitation Only"; note that Table 1 is restricted to
Republican contributors and shows only relative concentrations among those who made at least
one contribution to the GOR
16. See the Boston Globe, January 16, 1989.
17. See, e.g., "Presidential Campaign Hotline," February 23, 1988; Ferguson, "Who Bought Bush."
1 8. Though private banks usually provide much of such financing, transactions of this kind involve
official or unofficial cooperation by governments. They are in no way "free market" outcomes,
but involve high-level foreign policy deliberations. Cf. Philip Wellons, Passing the Buck (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1 987). Note also that short of mortally threatening internal un-
rest, Soviet gold reserves should make it a good credit risk.
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